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Despite being two relatively distant countries and with a diverse recent History, 
if we compare grosso modo some aspects of the History of Hungary and Spain we 
can find numerous coincidences which able us to elaborate a common scheme for 
both. In this paper I will analyze the parallel development which the two countries 
experienced during the 18th and 19th century, specifically how, in Spain as in 
Hungary, the building of the concept of nation, the settlement of liberal systems, the 
political participation and their posterior crisis followed similar phases. This 
similitude is the demonstration of the fact that, despite the differences that at first 
seem decisive, similarities are more relevant, being both countries inserted in a 
bigger context at a European level during the Late Modern Ages. 
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This essay has as a main goal the search and explanation of the common points 
and differences between two independent (at least at first sight) albeit indirectly 
related historical processes: the construction of the nation and the State –both of 
them in the liberal and contemporary meaning of the word- in the cases of 
Hungary and Spain during the late modern period. The time frame I choose for this 
work is then that of the „Long Nineteenth CeŶtuƌǇ” (1789-1914). During this 
aŶalǇsis, ǁe’ll paǇ speĐial atteŶtioŶ to the aspeĐts of ŶatioŶhood ďuildiŶg 
(primarily from a cultural perspective) and political participation in both countries. 
The final objective and target of the paper is thus to demonstrate the parallelism 
between the two processes, showing that despite being framed in different 
geographical contexts, the political trajectory of Spain and Hungary throughout 
the 19th century belong to a global phenomenon in a higher European setting, 
instead of being isolated phenomena. 
There have been previous studies on the comparison of the 19th century liberal 
Spain construction in its Western European context, such as the work of Manuel 
Santirso2, but they refer to the parallelism with closer countries such as France, 
Belgium or the United Kingdom, rather than to the similarities we could find with 
                                                             
1 I started this paper when I was an Erasmus exchange student in the Institute of History of the 
ELTE (2012-2013), and its elaboration is the result of several reflections and lectures taken in the course 
„Social History of Hungary in the 19th CeŶtuƌǇ”, iŵpaƌted ďǇ KáƌolǇ Halŵos, ǁith ǁhoŵ I had so ŵaŶǇ 
talks comparing the History of Hungary and that of Spain that are a big part of the origin of this work. I 
ǁould also like to thaŶk IstǀáŶ Majoƌos, ǁhose Đouƌses iŶtƌoduĐed ŵe to the faĐtual HistoƌǇ of HuŶgaƌǇ 
in the 19th century during my first semester in Budapest. 
2 SANTIRSO, Manuel: España eŶ la Euƌopa liďeƌal. Ariel Historia, Barcelona, 2012. 
 
 




more distant countries, like Hungary. Some work has also been done before about 
the common history between Hungary and Spain such as the book HuŶgƌía Ǉ 
España, ƌelaĐioŶes ŵileŶaƌias3, but its target is not exactly the same as the present 
essay, and focus entirely on historical relations. The development of such a rich 
topic could fill well a good number of volumes, but for space reasons I will try to 
summarize and emphasize, especially just in the processes that were coincident 
and identical in the political history both countries, leaving aside the obvious 
differences between Spain and Hungary throughout the late modern age. 
 
Comparison of backgrounds 
 
One of the biggest of these differences may be the complicated relationship 
between Hungary and Austria inside the Habsburg Monarchy through all the 18th 
and 19th centuries, a situation that finds no parallelism in the Spanish case (not even 
during the puppet government established by Napoleon). The relative subjugation of 
Hungary by Austria during the 18th and the first half of the 19th century determined 
decisively the shape of Hungarian liberalism and favored the national revival of 
Hungary and the pursue of a nation-state by the Magyars through the century. It also 
conditioned the economic development of Hungary, as the Habsburg relegated the 
Lands of the Holy Crown to the role of an economic colony that provided Austria 
with raw materials and in exchange imported its manufactures: an unequal system 
that haŶdiĐapped HuŶgaƌǇ’s iŶdustƌial deǀelopŵeŶt foƌ ŵoƌe thaŶ oŶe huŶdƌed 
years4. As a gloďal ĐouŶtƌǇ, SpaiŶ didŶ’t suffeƌ this kiŶd of disadǀaŶtage, though 
similar realities can be found among its regions. 
The second main factor that marked the decisive differences between both 
countries is the multiethnic nature of the historical Hungary –in 1786 just the 39% 
of HuŶgaƌǇ’s populatioŶ ǁas of MagǇaƌ ethŶiĐitǇ5-, something that differentiates it 
from the Spanish counterpart (Spain, for example, lacked the debate of a „Jewish 
QuestioŶ” through the 19th century onwards) and that led the nationalities inside 
the country to an independentism that ultimately would led the Old Hungarian 
Kingdom (inside the Habsburg Monarchy) to a collapse, as some historians state6.  
Related to this topic, another great historical differentiation between both 
countries can be made of their confessional setting since Early Modern Ages. While 
the Hispanic Kingdoms were progressively unified not just by politic but also by 
religious means, especially due to the imposition of the Inquisition and the expulsion 
of Jews in 1492 and the morisco7 population between 1609 and 1613, the historical 
                                                             
3 ANDERLE, Ádáŵ: HuŶgƌía Ǉ España: ƌelaĐioŶes ŵileŶaƌias. Szegedi EgǇeteŵi Kiadó, Szeged, 2007. 
4 CARTLEDGE, Bryan: The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary. Hurst & Company, London, 2011. 
135-136. 
5 Ibid. 154. 
6 BIDELEUX, Robert & JEFFRIES, Ian: A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change. Routledge, New 
York, 2007. 268. 
7 Moriscos was the name of the Muslim population remaining in the Hispanic Kingdoms after the 
conquest of Granada. They were expulsed in the beginning of the 17th century. 
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Hungary had during the whole Modern Age a rich diversity of confessions and 
religious institutions, including Catholics, Lutherans, Jews, Calvinists, Uniates and 
Orthodox. This religious diversity, interrelated with the question of nationalities 
(certain confessions encouraged certain kinds of nationalism, and even the feeling of 
attachment to a foreign power, as for example happened with the Orthodox 
Serbians of the south of the Monarchy with Serbia), gave Hungary a kind of social 
issues that SpaiŶ didŶ’t experience during the 19th century inside the Peninsula. Also, 
the different churches of each confession inside Hungary had a major role in the 
national awakening of each ethnicity, as it happened in Transylvania with the Vlach 
Uniates (who progressively acquired a Romanian self-awareness) under the 
leadership of the bishop InoceŶțiu Micu-Klein (1692-1768)8. 
Leaving aside aspects concerning ethnicity or the historical background, by far 
the most decisive of the divergences between the historical Hungary and Spain is, 
without doubt, the geographical setting of both. While Spain occupies the most part 
of the Iberian Peninsula and is surrounded by sea in most of its sides, the historical 
Hungary –and still more Hungary proper- was a landlocked country, with the only 
exception of the port of Fiume, incorporated in 1779 to the Kingdom by Maria 
Theresa9. While the Hispanic Kingdom, located in the western side of Europe, had a 
traditional trend for Mediterranean or Atlantic economical and even imperialist 
expansion (which led to the creation of a colonial empire during Early Modern Ages), 
Hungary remained during its history as an interior land, working as a nexus between 
East and West, and with fewer possibilities of ultramarine contact and innovation. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe shouldŶ’t uŶdeƌǀalue its possiďilities: HuŶgaƌǇ alǁaǇs took adǀaŶtage 
of the Danube as a main international communication and trade nexus with other 
EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies, soŵethiŶg that doesŶ’t have a parallel in Spain, where no 
navigable rivers communicating the Peninsula with external spaces exist. 
 
Comparing the Age of Enlightenment 
 
The origins of liberal culture and nationalism development can be traced in 
both countries to the end of the 18th century, with the first attempts of reform 
„fƌoŵ aďove” and the expansion of the Enlightenment ideas. In Spain these 
attempts were expressed by the proposals of reform of Gaspar Melchor de 
Jovellanos (1744-1811) and the desaŵoƌtizaĐióŶ (seizure of goods of the privileged 
strata) of Manuel Godoy in 1798. Hungary experienced this dynamic earlier with 
the seizure of the monasteries and nunneries of contemplative orders by the 
Patent of the king Joseph II of 1781 -a measure that seems to anticipate those 
taken in Spain during the 1830s by the liberal governments, and even before by 
the Napoleonic administration- that dissolved 136 of 255 monasteries in Hungary, 
as the studǇ of Péteƌ Ban states10. We can compare it with the measures taken in 
                                                             
8 CARTLEDGE (2011): 157. 
9 Ibid. 130. 
10 Quoted by: BEALES, Derek: Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe. I.B. Tauris, 
 
 




Spain some decades later: in 1808 the Napoleonic government of Joseph I 
Bonaparte proclaimed the dissolution of two thirds of the monasteries in Spain, 
among other confiscations and seizures, and the year after the same government 
proclaimed the disbandment of all the convents and religious orders11. However, 
the measures of the afrancesado12 administration were soon cut by the return of 
the absolutism of Ferdinand VII in 1813 and 1823. 
In this process the French Revolution had an important role -serving as a model 
and inspiration for enlightened, liberal and even Jacobite republican societies 
abroad (which would have a higher importance in Hungary than in Spain, mixing 
the republican exigencies with the claim for more independence and social and 
land reforms) and both countries experienced the same reaction towards it on 
behalf of the ruling dynasties (the Spanish Bourbons and the Habsburg in 
Hungary), which were related to the French Bourbons by family ties, with the 
establishment of censorship against the new ideas. In Hungary the repression was 
intensified after the so-called „MaƌtiŶoviĐs Plot”, and in 1801 total censorship was 
estaďlished foƌ jouƌŶals that didŶ’t pass the revision of the police13. In Spain the 
observance was the hardest in Europe (probably because of the proximity with 
France)14; in 1791 the State Secretary Count of Floridablanca (1728-1808) forbid 
the whole press publications, creating a cordon sanitaire towards France and 
watching over the French population in Spain to prevent the infiltration of 
revolutionary ideas into the Peninsula. 
Both ĐouŶtƌies ǁeƌe, at the eŶd of the AŶĐieŶ Régiŵe, iŶ the saŵe eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
and social situation: a completely agrarian economy with almost no industrial 
production -excepting, in the case of Spain the early textile industries of the region 
of Catalonia and some dispersed manufactures in Castile- with a bad distribution 
of land property (which, in major part, was in the hands of latifundia of the 
aristocratic landowners who inherited them by the entail) and a rigid estate 
society in which the nobility (very abundant in both countries: nobles constituted 
5% of the Spanish population in the 1787 census, and 4-5% of the Hungarian 
population in 178415) and the Catholic Church were sustained by their rents and 
were tax-exempted. In addition, the income losses produced by the fall of the 
American colonies and the participation in the Napoleonic Wars in the case of 
Spain left the economy totally exhausted.  
The major part of the population had thus an agrarian occupation in both 
                                                                                                                                              
London, 2005. 248. 
11 PRO, Juan et alii: Estado Ǉ teƌƌitoƌio eŶ España, ϭϴϮϬ-ϭϵϯϬ. La foƌŵaĐióŶ del paisaje ŶaĐional 
1820-1930. Catarata, Madrid, 2007. 534. 
12 People of francophile behavior or ideas (particularly enlightened philosophy) were popularly 
known in Spain with the rather derogative term of afrancesado (frenchified), a word that later defined 
the Spanish populatioŶ that suppoƌted the Ŷeǁ ƌégiŵe of Joseph I BoŶapaƌte. Thousands of them had 
to leave the country and restart their lives in France after Napoleon’s final defeat in the Peninsular War. 
13 CARTLEDGE (2011): 147. 
14 CARR, Raymond: España ϭϴϬϴ-2008. Ariel, 2008. 74.  
15 ANDERSON, Matthew: Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1789. Routledge, 2014. 45-46. 
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countries, with an economic output based on grain production and cattle breeding. 
Population has been esteemed for Hungary at the end of the 18th Century (1786) as 
8.6 million inhabitants16, while in peninsular Spain, a country larger than the 
historical Hungary, historians estimate 11 million inhabitants in 178717. In 18th 
century the population of Hungary and Spain, which had grown since the beginning 
of the century, was especially settled in the periphery with the result of a 
depopulated central area of the country. This depopulation of the central area was 
due in the case of Spain to the hard demographic and economic crisis of the 17th 
century (wars included), and in the case of Hungary it was caused to the long period 
of fighting between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, which led to the devastation 
and depopulation of the central plain in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
In the political area, both countries had a representative organ typical from the 
AŶĐieŶ Régiŵe, oƌgaŶized ďǇ estates aŶd ǁithout a gƌeat politiĐal effeĐtiǀeŶess. IŶ 
Hungary the Diet had been progressively ignored by the Austrian monarchs 
throughout the second half of the 18th century, and in Spain the Courts (Diet) of Castile 
fell into disuse during the century18, while the Courts of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia 
were cancelled at the beginning of the 18th century by the Bourbon centralism. 
We can thus see that both countries had a similar economic, social and even (in 
some senses) political situation during the last decades of the 18th century and the 
beginning of the 19th century, an obsolete base on which the liberal state machinery 
would settle along the century, sometimes in a progressive and peaceful way and 
sometimes with violent means. Thus, throughout the first half of the 19th century, in 
Hungary as in Spain, two parallel phenomena were to be developed: the growth of 
the liberal culture (including the germs of the future party system) and the formation 
of a national and cultural identity adapted to the new liberal ideas. 
 
Birth of nationalism 
 
As the British historian Eric Hobsbawm stated on his work about nationalism19 
aŶd José Álǀaƌez JuŶĐo stated foƌ the Đase of SpaiŶ20, there was a previous feeling 
of „proto-national” identity -Hobsbawm uses the example of Russia as a 
paradigm21- long time ago, but it was in the first years of the 19th century when a 
culture of national identity, closely related to the political liberalism (the first step 
for a Nation-State) was developed.  
This „proto-ŶatioŶalisŵ” –that can be related with the idea of „ethnic 
patƌiotisŵ” aďout ǁhiĐh Álǀaƌez JuŶĐo talks, ďut Ŷot the saŵe ĐoŶĐept as „ethnic 
                                                             
16 CARTLEDGE (2011): 154. 
17 ANES, Gonzalo: El Antiguo RégiŵeŶ: Los BoƌďoŶes (vol. IV), IN „Histoƌia de España Alfaguaƌa”, 
directed by Miguel ARTOLA. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1976. 27. 
18 Ibid. 304. 
19 HOBSBAWM, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
20 ÁLVAREZ JUNCO, José: Mateƌ doloƌosa. La idea de España eŶ el siglo XIX. Santillana, Madrid, 2001. 
21 HOBSBAWM (1992): 50. 
 
 




patƌiotisŵ” doesŶ’t ŶeĐessaƌǇ ĐaƌƌǇ to „proto-ŶatioŶalisŵ” 22- can be traced to 
earlier centuries, and was identified little by little, in Spain and Hungary as in other 
countries such as England or France, with a territory that was vertebrate around a 
monarchy23 –in the case of Spain, the Habsburg Monarchy (the MoŶaƌƋuía de los 
Austrias) and in the case of Hungary, the Old HungaƌiaŶ KiŶgdoŵ of the ÁƌpádiaŶ 
Dynasty- that in both countries  brought together peoples of different institutions 
and languages under the same Crown. From the institutional point of view it is 
enough to think on the amount of kingdoms that formed the Spanish Monarchy 
(Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Valencia and the Princedom of Catalonia just in the 
Peninsula, each of them with their own customs and laws), or the special situation 
that some areas of HungarǇ eŶjoǇed (suĐh as the speĐial status of the SzékelǇ aŶd 
Saxon communities, or the degree of autonomy that Transylvania had enjoyed 
since the tenth century inside the Kingdom24). 
In Hungary the question of language was quite meaningful, and it carried to a 
renaissance without precedents of the Hungarian language that started at the end 
of the 18th century. This happened despite the efforts of Joseph II to Germanize 
the administration and the resistance of other nationalities inside Hungary that 
preferred Latin as the official language of the Diet and of legislation inside the 
Kingdom, because of its value as a „Ŷeutƌal” tool of understanding25. However, 
Latin continued to be the official tongue in these areas of government until 1843 –
despite its linguistic distance with Hungarian language, which made it a language 
suitable just for the educated-, when it was definitely replaced by Hungarian. Thus, 
the controversy among the non-Magyar nationalities continued as the old proto-
national concept of Hungarus started to be related just to Magyar-speakers. This 
was not the case of Spain, where the Castilian language replaced the usage of Latin 
and other vernaculars -among them, Aragonese or Catalan, in use inside the 
Crown of Aragon- during the 16th and the 17th centuries in the Estate 
bureaucracy26, enjoying an unmatched preeminence in all levels of life, especially 
since the instauration of a more centralist State during the Bourbon dynasty in the 
18th century. However, Latin remained the language of teaching in some Spanish 
universities until 1813, when it was definitely replaced by Castilian27. As we can 
see, Latin language played at that time a rather marginal role in Spain, in 
comparison with its use in Hungary. 
Even if the case of Spain differs to that of Hungary in the use of a national 
language, we can say that the renaissance of Hungarian language and culture 
                                                             
22 ÁLVAREZ (2001): 61. 
23 Ibid. 63. 
24 ENGEL, Pál: The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary (895-1526). I.B. Tauris, 
London, 2005. 24. 
25 WAQUET, FƌaŶçoise: Latin, or the Empire of a Sign: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth 
Centuries. Verso, London, 2001. 96. 
26 ÁLVAREZ JUNCO, José: Mateƌ doloƌosa. La idea de España eŶ el siglo XIX. Santillana, Madrid, 
2010. 79.  
27 WAQUET (2001): 25.  
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reminds that of the Catalan language and ethnology during the Catalan ReŶaiǆeŶça 
(the Catalan „ReŶaissaŶĐe”) since the decade of the thirties in the 19th century, 
when the Catalan culture started to be researched and put into value again, not 
necessarily from a nationalist point of view. Thus, a comparison of the Hungarian 
cultural rebirth could be established in terms of chronology and culture with the 
Renaissance of Catalan culture towards the end of the 19th century. 
Turning back to the Spain-Hungary similarities, the creation of a cultural 
expression of nationalism and liberalism had its reflection in the literature of both 
countries; in the case of Hungary in the hand of playwrights and poets in the 
revitalized Magyar language, such as MihálǇ Vöƌösŵarty (1800-1855), Ferenc 
KölĐseǇ (ϭϳϵϬ-1838), and especially SáŶdoƌ Petőfi (1823-1848), very often involved 
in liberal politiĐs as ǁeƌe José de EspƌoŶĐeda (ϭϴϬϴ-1842) or the journalist 
MaƌiaŶo José de Laƌƌa (ϭϴϬϵ-1837) in Spain. The creation of the nationalist and 
romantic feeling was related to the creation of the first national Histories, a role 
played in Spain by the historian Modesto Lafuente (1806-1866). In both countries 
a lot of national cultural institutions were created, such as the National Museum of 
Hungary (1807) or the Museum of El Prado in Madrid (1819). 
 
Reform and Revolution: the Age of Liberalism 
 
Concurrently, a new liberal political culture was extended and little by little 
iŵpƌegŶated the HuŶgaƌiaŶ Diet ǁith suĐh figuƌes as IstǀáŶ SzéĐheŶǇi (ϭϳϵϭ-1860) 
and Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). This expansion of liberal culture in the 
representation organ was totally different in Spain, where there was no continuity 
with the AŶĐieŶ Régiŵe Couƌt aŶd ǁheƌe the PaƌliaŵeŶt ǁas gatheƌed iŶ Cádiz iŶ 
1810 during the French invasion, for it was the French invasion and the war against 
Napoleon the factor that created in Spain the power-vacuum that was suitable for 
the formation of a Parlament with a liberal program. From this point of view, the 
French invasion and the event of the Peninsular War were the spring that permitted 
the start of the liberal development iŶ SpaiŶ, a situatioŶ that didŶ’t haǀe its 
counterpart in Hungary because of its lack of a French occupation. The end of the 
French occupation in 1813 led also in Spain to the end of the first phase of liberal rise 
of Spain, as well as to the end of the progressist measures of the Napoleonic puppet 
government of Joseph I Bonaparte, and to the return of absolutism. 
Differently to Hungary, where there was no violent confrontation between the 
nation and the monarch until the 1848 revolution, in Spain the liberalism was settled 
in the system in the first half of the century with advances and recoils through 
ƌeǀolutioŶs aŶd Đoup d’état: liďeƌalisŵ ǁas eƌadicated by the absolutism in 1814, 
and it came back between 1820 and 1823 (during the so called „Liberal TrieŶŶiuŵ”), 
and after a second repression by the absolutism it was settled progressively (again 
with some recoils) in the Constitutions of 1837, 1845 and 1869. 
This difference in the creation of a political liberal culture doesŶ’t aǀoid, 
however, finding common places between Spain and Hungary. In both countries 
 
 




two main trends of liberalism were developed (with some major differences): the 
moderated and the more progressist one. The moderate option, represented –
with abismal differences, however, in the ideas and modus operandi- in Hungary 
ďǇ IstǀáŶ SzéĐheŶǇi aŶd RaŵóŶ Maƌía Naƌǀáez (ϭϴϬϬ-1868) in Spain, searched for 
changes through controlled reforms, avoiding the expansion of suffrage and 
agreeing with the monarchy. The radical trend was represented in Hungary by 
Lajos Kossuth and in Spain by the general Baldomero Espartero (1793-1879), both 
charismatic and military figures of prestige. 
During the first half of the 19th century the politic nation was enlarged in Spain 
and the voting franchise was extended. DuƌiŶg the Cádiz PaƌliaŵeŶt of ϭϴϭϬ the 
deputies were designed by Indirect Male Universal Suffrage (proclaimed again in 
the 1812 Constitution), something that would be abandoned again with the return 
of absolutism. The 1837 Constitution (after the definite fall of absolutism) 
established a censitary suffrage that extended the number of voters to the 2,2% of 
the Spanish population28, a number that was still more reduced to the 0,8% of the 
population by the electoral law of 184629. Considering these figures, we see that 
the representative system of the Hungarian Diet was wider than the Spanish one 
(among other factors, due to the large amount of nobility members) during the 
first half of the century, even if it was less advanced: indeed, it was wider than that 
of the French Parliament at that time30. The Spanish electoral laws were changed 
again in numerous occasions, being enlarged by the Progressists when they were 
ruling, and reduced by the Moderates when they substituted them, until finally the 
Male Universal Suffrage was established for six years after the Revolution of 1868, 
during the so-called „Democratic Sexennium”. In Hungary, in the other hand, the 
enlargement of the political nation, which was still for a long time in the hands of 
pƌiǀileged estates, didŶ’t happeŶ uŶtil ϭϴϰϴ in spite of the petitions of the Lower 
Chaŵďeƌ deputies suĐh as FeƌeŶĐ KölĐseǇ31. 
It is, without any doubt, the 1848 Revolution which marked a change in the 
Hungarian political culture after the so called „Refoƌŵ Age”. It cannot be 
compared to a specific Spanish event, but there are some elements in common 
between the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and the bourgeois liberal revolutions that 
took place in Spain between 1810 and 1868. The Hungarian „Twelve Points” can be 
compared to a synthesis of the same exigencies that the Spanish liberals 
proclaimed at the same time, like a summary of the 1812 or the 1869 Constitution, 
due to its base liberalism. SuŵŵaƌiziŶg, eǀeŶ if the ϭϴϰϴ ReǀolutioŶ doesŶ’t haǀe 
its exact equivalent in the Spanish history, its values and spirit can be considered a 
                                                             
28 PAREDES, Javier (coord.): Histoƌia CoŶteŵpoƌáŶea de España ;siglo XIXͿ. Ariel Historia, Barcelona, 
2002. 140. 
29 GARRIDO, Auƌoƌa: Los sisteŵas eleĐtoƌales español e italiaŶo: de la iŵplaŶtaĐióŶ a la Đƌisis del Estado 
liberal. IN: CASMIRRI, Silvana & SUÁREZ CORTINA, Manuel. (eds.): La Euƌopa del Suƌ eŶ la époĐa liďeƌal: 
España, Italia Ǉ Poƌtugal, uŶa peƌspeĐtiva Đomparada, Universidad de Cantabria, 1998. 251-272. 253. 
30 DE FERDINANDY, Miguel: Histoƌia de HuŶgƌía: uŶ pueďlo eŶtƌe OƌieŶte Ǉ OĐĐideŶte. Alianza, 
Madrid, 1966. 170. 
31 CARTLEDGE (2011): 172. 
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synthesis of those of the Spanish revolutions of 1820, 1855 and 1868. 
One of the main points of the Hungarian revolutionaries was the settlement, 
through the Act V of 1848, of the first enlargement of the Hungarian political 
nation. Every man over twenty years old, without crime charges and with a 
property of 300 florins or 8-20 acres of terrain obtained the right to vote. This way 
the 25% of the adult male population of Hungary could participate in the 
franchise32, the 7% of the total population33. This electoral law was more 
progressive and advanced (it comprised more population) that the franchise of 
Spain at that time. 
During the years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the old system of 
landowning started to be dismantled, especially during the emancipations of 1848 
and 185334 that abolished entailment (however, it survived in other forms for 
more decades35).  In Spain these measures, that put the land in free capital 
circulation aŶd aďolished the AŶĐieŶ Régiŵe privileges, took place already in the 
decade of the 1830s. Part of this project were the desamortizaciones proclaimed 
by the liberal ministers, which we already mentioned. The most important was 
that of Juan de MeŶdizáďal (started in 1836), whose goal was to nationalize and 
sell the properties of the Church36. 
 
A conservative solution: „Kiegyezés” and „Restauración” 
 
The next big period in the formation of a liberal state and political culture in 
Spain, after the 1868 and the turbulent age of the „DeŵoĐƌatiĐ SeǆeŶiuŵ” (1868-
1874), started in 1874 with the return of the Bourbon dynasty, the institution of 
the „tuƌŶiŶg” system and the beginning of the age known as the RestauƌaĐióŶ 
(Restoration). It is possible to find numerous points of coincidence with the period 
of Dual-Monarchy and the 1867 Compromise in Hungary. 
In first place, in both countries this age represents the culmination of the 
liberal project and the definitive instauration of its state. Both in the age of the 
Compromise (in the case of Hungary) as in the age of Restoration (in the case of 
Spain) the creation of a political system that lasted until the end of the First World 
War (beginning its crisis in the first decade of the 20th century). Both political 
systems were born from a compromise of moderated and relatively conservative 
character, with a Parliament-limited monarchy, and both were promoted by a 
leading political and intellectual figure of liberal moderated character: in the case 
                                                             
32 Ibid. 196. 
33 KÖVÉR, GǇöƌgǇ et alii: Social History of Hungary from the Reform Era to the end of the 20th 
century. Social Science Monographs, 2004. 154. 
34 CARTLEDGE (2011): 255. 
35 Ibid. 256. 
36 JuaŶ de Dios Álǀaƌez de MeŶdizáďal, MiŶisteƌ of the TƌeasuƌǇ ďetǁeeŶ ϭϴϯϱ aŶd ϭϴϯϲ, 
proclaimed several ecclesiastical confiscations that suppressed the monasteries with less than twelve 
inhabitants and put their goods to public sale. The main goal of this measure was to earn a source of 
money to afford the expenses of the civil wars that shook Spain after the fall of the absolutism. 
 
 




of SpaiŶ AŶtoŶio CáŶoǀas del Castillo (1828-1897), and in the case of Hungary 
FeƌeŶĐ Deák (ϭϴϬϯ-1876). 
In both countries this period was defined by an inflexible and predetermined 
political structure: in Spain by the rigid turnismo of the two main parties (in 
practice, not very different from each other); the Conservatives and the 
Progressists (who made turns in the government through pacts, thus managing to 
win always with astonishing absolute majorities, between the 82,7% of the 
Parliament in 1901 and the 98,2% reached in 188437), and in Hungary –where 
governments were appointed first and later elections were held too38, as it was the 
case of Spain- by the permanence in power of the Liberal party (whose main 
leadeƌ ǁas Kálŵán Tisza), so called „the goveƌŶŵeŶt paƌtǇ” because of its 
continuity and its composition of State bureaucrats and parliamentarians39.  
Both systems avoided the insertion of real political alternatives in the government, 
and both had a member composition based on the high society. In both the Hungarian 
and Spanish cases, the ruling parties were supported by a rural elite that used its 
influence and local power to reach their objectives: the magnates in Hungary and the 
caciques (local oligarchy) in Spain. The electoral system was totally corrupted in both 
countries –as it happened in many other countries in Europe- by the electoral fiddles 
and the gerrymandering that ensured the permanence of the ruling parties in the 
government and were an accepted part of the system. 
It was in this period when the Male Universal Suffrage was adopted in 1890 
(under the rule of the Progressist Party), already established briefly during the 
„DeŵoĐƌatiĐ SeǆeŶŶiuŵ”. In Hungary the franchise was still strongly censitary, 
limited to the 6% of the Hungarian population in the Law XXXIII of 187440. In 1913 
another electoral law was proclaimed, for which the 8,7% of the population was 
allowed to vote41, but at this time the franchise in Hungary was backward 
compared to that of the Western European countries: finally the claims for 
Universal Suffrage were transformed in social unrest that led to the „Red 
ThuƌsdaǇ” events in 190342. The law of 1913 also introduced secret ballots in some 
cities, which were already established in Spain since 1837. 
Both systems, the political systems of the ages of Restoration and the Dualism, 
entered in a crisis during the first decade of the 20th century. In Spain and Hungary 
those were years of big social conflicts, with large harvest strikes such as the 
organized by the Andalusian jornaleros (day laborers) between 1902 and 1903, or 
the events of the Tragic Week of Barcelona of 190943.  
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In 1905 a coalition of the opposition parties managed to defeat the Liberal 
Party of Istǀán Tisza for first time in the elections, signing the end of a political 
dynamic that was in course since the 1867 Compromise and starting a political 
turning point. In the same years the turning Spanish parties entered a crisis too 
and started to dismember, thus marking the end of the age of the Restoration and 
staƌtiŶg a Ŷeǁ époƋue. Both systems -born from a preconceived planning between 
the 1860s and the 1870s- started to fall down. 
In Hungary the First World War would sign the end of the Dual-Monarchy 
system, and after an attempt of communist revolution the authoritarian option of 
Miklós HoƌthǇ was established in 1920. In Spain the crisis of the Restoration 
system led into the settlement in 1923 of another authoritarian rule, the 
conservative dictatorship of the general Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870-1930), a 
character of similar views to those of Admiral Horthy, which lasted until 1930. 





As it was analyzed in this brief dissertation, in spite of the obvious differences 
ďetǁeeŶ SpaiŶ aŶd HuŶgaƌǇ, it’s possible to locate numerous coincidences in the 
historic development of the Liberal state and nationhood in the two cases. Both 
countries started in similar social and economic conditions, typical from the Ancien 
Régiŵe, constructed their identity and developed a liberal and reformist ideology 
throughout the last decades of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th 
century together with a nation culture with marked romantic character. Both 
countries experienced decisive liberal revolutions in the middle of the century that 
were to led to the settlement of the Liberal Nation-State in the context of a 
parliamentary monarchy, with experiments that were not always definitely 
successful, such as the Independence of 1848 or the Democratic Sexennium. 
Along the last third of the 19th century, however, a new political system was 
adopted and maintained, in both countries a rigid and conservative structure, 
monarchic and parliamentary, with a high influence of the local oligarchies and 
which relied in preconceived voting results. This system would last until the first 
decades of the 20th century, when it entered in a crisis that made the hegemonic 
parties lose the control of the government and made them divide, giving place to 
political alternatives. The institutional weakness resulting from the crisis of the 
system, intensified by the situation of Europe after the First World War, led to the 
rise of the conservative authoritarian rule of two military characters in the 
                                                                                                                                              
Barcelona when the reserve troops who were going to be embarked towards Morocco rioted in the 
port of the city. The reason of this unrest had a social cause: the reserve troops had humble origins, 
ǁhile the soŶs of ďouƌgeois faŵilies didŶ’t haǀe to go to the ĐoloŶial ǁaƌs as theǇ paid aŶ eǆeŵptioŶ. 








tǁeŶties, Miklós Horthy and Miguel Primo de Rivera, who presented themselves 
as the saviors of theiƌ ĐouŶtƌies’ staďilitǇ. 
Despite the distance and in spite of what National Historiography asserted 
since 19th century -with a great influence on what nowadays is still found in the 
consciousness of peoples44, such as myths or preconceived ideas of self-
peculiarity- in these pages we have seen, through the parallel evolution of both 
countries’ politiĐs, that Hungary and Spain followed a similar pattern of 
development of their liberal systems and of their political progress. This pattern 
represents the logical evolution of two countries shaped inside a bigger European 
context, and it shows us that we have to look at historical processes as a part of a 
larger background. This is still valuable nowadays; when contemporary 
phenomena like globalization and the opening of borders is making us be more 
similar between ourselves as the times goes by. 
 
                                                             
44 GEARY, Patrick J.: The Myth of Nations: the Medieval Origins of Europe. Princeton University 
Press, 2002. 15.  
